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Authentication and Foundation

Kansas law in K.S.A. 60-464 provides that authentication of a writing is required before it may be received in evidence and provides, further, that this may be accomplished by evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of its authenticity or by any other means provided by law. The issue with authentication is whether a writing is what it is claimed to be.

The proper objection would be, “Objection, no foundation has been established.” You must always object at the time, or the objection will be waived.

As a practical matter, most foundation issues can be agreed to in advance by the parties in a joint stipulation, with the Subpoena for Business Records followed up with an adequately phrased Request for Admission, with a stipulation in the Pretrial Order.

Foundation for a voice identification in a recording requires that the witness heard the voice, and from his or her familiarity with the speaker’s voice is of the opinion (there is no requirement he or she be an expert) that it belongs to the speaker.

Federal Rules of Evidence 901(b) sets out examples of testimony that would establish authentication.

The authenticity of a handwriting can be proved by someone who saw the author write the handwriting or is familiar with the author’s past writings or by indirect evidence. What about a Facebook page? State v. Jones, a Kansas case said:

“Printouts of web pages must first be authenticated as accurately reflecting the content of the page and the image of the page on the computer at which the printout was made before they can be introduced into evidence. Then, to be relevant and material to the case at hand, the printouts often will need to be further authenticated as having been posted by a particular source. See Smoot, 316 Ga.App. at 109–110(4)(a). State v. Jones, 318 P.3d 1020 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014)”

In Jones, the ex-wife testified she was familiar with the Facebook page, often communicated using it, and she had seen the posts on the page. The court said other issues as to whether the defendant authored the posts included a question about the weight of the evidence, not admissibility.

What about emails? The best evidence rule is satisfied by a printout. See FRE 1001(d). More importantly, the federal rule specifically contemplates that “[f]or electronically stored information, ‘original’ means any printout—or other output readable by sight—if it accurately reflects the information. State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11, 222, 363 P.3d 875, 1019 (2015), provided there is no genuine dispute regarding authenticity. (“e-mail offers unique opportunities for fabrication, it is held to the same standards of authentication as other similar evidence”); Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 450, 945 N.E.2d 372 (2011), State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11, 224, 363 P.3d 875, 1021 (2015), disapproved of by State v. Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017).

The State proffered Remington’s testimony outside the presence of the jury to authenticate these exhibits. Based on her independent recollection, Remington testified that State’s Exhibits 4 and 5 were printouts from her home computer of e-mails she received from and sent to Robinson when he was posing as Trouten. She confirmed the content of the messages were true and accurate and that she did not alter them. Based on this testimony, the State adequately authenticated State’s Exhibits 4 and 5.
State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11, 226, 363 P.3d 875, 1022 (2015), disapproved of by State v. Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017). Kearley v. State, 843 So.2d 66, 70 (Miss.App.2002) (e-mails properly authenticated where witness vouched for accuracy of printouts); Shea v. State, 167 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex.App.2005) (e-mails authenticated where complaining witness testified *227 she was familiar with the defendant’s e-mail and received the messages from him); Tibbetts v. RadioShack Corp., No. 03–C–2249, 2004 WL 2203418, at *13 (N.D.Ill.2004) (unpublished opinion) (copies of e-mails authenticated by sales manager’s testimony they were true and accurate copies); see also Annot., 34 A.L.R. 6th 253 (Authentication of Electronically Stored Evidence) § 2, pp. 269–70 (citing Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 9:9 [3d ed.] [witness who viewed original e-mail need testify only that the printout is an accurate reproduction] ). State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11, 226–27, 363 P.3d 875, 1022 (2015), disapproved of by State v. Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017)

What about Photos? The person who takes a photo need not be the person who identifies it, State v. Pruitt, 42 Kan. App. 2d 166, 211 P. 3d 166 (2009). So, it’s sufficient for the witness to testify that the photo of injuries correctly represents his injuries on this night and that the photos were taken the following day.

Q.  I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 2. What is depicted in that photograph?

A.  A stoplight at the intersection of 4th and Pine.

Q.  Is that photograph a fair and accurate representation of the stoplight at 4th and Pine as it existed on the day of the collision?

A.  Yes, it is.

You can move for admission of the photograph into evidence. 

What if something about the scene depicted in the photograph has changed since the date of the collision?  In the example above, for example, what if the crash occurred on a snowy day, but the photograph was taken on a day without snow?

If you are using the photograph not to demonstrate the ground cover, but the position of the stoplight, ask the second question like this: “With the exception of absence of snow from the ground, is the photograph marked as Exhibit 2 for identification a fair and accurate representation of the intersection at 4th and Pine on the date of the collision?”

If evidence is excluded, make a proffer using K.S.A. 60-405 to preserve the issue on appeal.

Source: James W. Jeans, Trial Advocacy p. 11.6 (West 1975), Kansas Evidence Objections, Michael Am Barbara, and Kansas Law and Practice, Barbara.

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The case involved an auto-truck accident where a person was injured when the car she was riding in was rear-ended by a semi-truck. The statutory cap on pain and suffering damages during the accident was $250,000, and the jury came in with a verdict for the pain of $301,509.14.

Here’s a link to the decision.

The court said that when the right to a jury trial was placed in the Kansas constitution, the legislature was prevented from making modifications or limits to the right. The court attempted to explain why the same reasoning would not apply to on the job injuries of employees where the statutes eliminate jury trials altogether, explaining at length why it’s ok to have the wholesale abolition and replacement of the right to jury trials in the workers compensation area but not ok to limit the amount of an award. The court also attempted to explain why it’s ok for the legislature to eliminate jury trials altogether for claims under $2,000 in medical bills which do not otherwise meet the statutory threshold, but it’s not ok to limit the size of the verdict. In making the decision, the Kansas Supreme court said, in this case, it is not bound by it’s previous decisions to the contrary saying it is no longer inexorably bound by precedent when the current court decides the prior court decision was erroneous or no longer sound in the opinion of a simple majority of the currently sitting judges.

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Here’s the facts of the case. A drunk driver, with blood alcohol content of .179, ran a red light at high speed, hitting another vehicle which resulted in the other driver having extensive injuries. The bartenders had continued to serve the drunk even after they knew he was incapacitated by alcohol and knew he was a threat to others. The court has been dismissing such claims for a long time and listed its previous decisions on the issue including:

• dismissing a wrongful death action against a university for supplying alcohol to a minor who killed a person while driving dunk,
• dismissing a claim against a college frat house for injuries to a minor whom members supplied alcohol in 2012,
• dismissing a claim for a minor alcohol related death where a vendor provided the alcohol in 1992
• dismissing a wrongful death action against a business that supplied liquor to drunken driver in 1986.

The plaintiffs in this case pointed out these similar decisions are outdated, create inexplicable immunity for alcohol vendors, and are bad public policy. A dissent in one of the previous cases said that this law is judge made, judge applied, and unjust. Most state and federal courts that have considered these issues since 1960, have rejected the Kansas Supreme Court position as patently unsound, and hold that a seller can be held liable for furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated minor who injuries a third person. (see Jackson v. Cadillac Cowboy, 986 SW 2d 410)

Here’s the legalese version: The Kansas Supreme Court ruled on May 10^th, 2019 that no redress exists against persons selling, giving, or furnishing intoxicating liquor for resulting injuries or damages because of the acts of intoxicated persons, on the theory that the dispensing of the liquor constituted either a direct wrong or actionable negligence in the case of Kudlacik vs. Johnn’s Shawnee click here.

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After graduating top five in my class at law school, I had two job offers and took the offer to work as a Research Attorney at the Kansas Court of Appeals. At the end of that term, I was pregnant with my first child and had to figure out how to handle children and a career. My husband, Joe, had recently started the law firm Patton and Patton where I began to work. I took my daughter, Michelle, to work with me for the first six months. About the time she started crawling around the office, I decided it was time to stay at home to care for her. I proceeded to have three more children in the next few years, but I continued to help with the office accounting for the new law firm.

I returned to work as a lawyer after my youngest was in school. The work life balance was always a struggle, but I did my best and had to lower my expectations of having a house that looked like something on TV.  The law practice gave me a lot of flexibility with time so that I could attend school activities and be there for my children. My husband was very supportive of my choices both to work and leave work when I felt I needed to for our family.

I was in a mostly male environment in my law practice, and almost all of my colleagues and judges in the Workers Compensation arena were male.  There were times when I did feel some discriminatory attitudes, but the majority of my colleagues, clients and judges were respectful and took my representation of clients seriously. I found that when I treated the opposing counsel with respect, they would do the same. I was part of the Women’s Attorney Association, which provided some valued camaraderie with other women in the profession.  I was also fortunate to have some unique opportunities in the middle of my legal career to change things up and be the Chief Administrator at Cair-Paravel Latin School for four years and serve as Executive Director of Topeka City of Character for two years after which I returned to the practice of law at Patton and Patton. Nowadays, I feel blessed to have lots of female colleagues in the practice and appear before many excellent female Judges.  I am at home with my role as a mother, grandmother and professional, and I’m looking forward to retirement at the end of the year so I can spend more time with family, friends and to serve my community.

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Evidence Refresher 

Authentication and Foundation

Kansas law in K.S.A. 60-464 provides that authentication of a writing is required before it may be received in evidence and provides, further, that this may be accomplished by evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of its authenticity or by any other means provided by law. The issue with authentication is whether a writing is what it is claimed to be.

The proper objection would be, “Objection, no foundation has been established.” You must always object at the time, or the objection will be waived.

As a practical matter, most foundation issues can be agreed to in advance by the parties in a joint stipulation, with the Subpoena for Business Records (cp. https://www.kansasjudicialcouncil.org/legal-forms/civil-actions/chapter-60/subpoenas/ksa-60-245a-subpoena-nonparty-business-records ) followed up with an adequately phrased Request for Admission, with a stipulation in the Pretrial Order.

Foundation for a voice identification in a recording requires that the witness heard the voice, and from his or her familiarity with the speaker’s voice is of the opinion (there is no requirement he or she be an expert) that it belongs to the speaker.

Federal Rules of Evidence 901(b) sets out examples of testimony that would establish authentication.

The authenticity of a handwriting can be proved by someone who saw the author write the handwriting or is familiar with the author’s past writings or by indirect evidence. What about a Facebook page? State v. Jones, a Kansas case said:

“Printouts of web pages must first be authenticated as accurately reflecting the content of the page and the image of the page on the computer at which the printout was made before they can be introduced into evidence. Then, to be relevant and material to the case at hand, the printouts often will need to be further authenticated as having been posted by a particular source. See Smoot, 316 Ga.App. at 109–110(4)(a). State v. Jones, 318 P.3d 1020 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014)”

In Jones, the ex-wife testified she was familiar with the Facebook page, often communicated using it, and she had seen the posts on the page. The court said other issues as to whether the defendant authored the posts included a question about the weight of the evidence, not admissibility.

What about emails? The best evidence rule is satisfied by a printout. See FRE 1001(d). More importantly, the federal rule specifically contemplates that “[f]or electronically stored information, ‘original’ means any printout—or other output readable by sight—if it accurately reflects the information. State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11, 222, 363 P.3d 875, 1019 (2015), provided there is no genuine dispute regarding authenticity. (“e-mail offers unique opportunities for fabrication, [but] it is held to the same standards of authentication as other similar evidence”); Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 450, 945 N.E.2d 372 (2011)

State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11, 224, 363 P.3d 875, 1021 (2015), disapproved of by State v. Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017)

The State proffered Remington’s testimony outside the presence of the jury to authenticate these exhibits. Based on her independent recollection, Remington testified that State’s Exhibits 4 and 5 were printouts from her home computer of e-mails she received from and sent to Robinson when he was posing as Trouten. She confirmed the content of the messages were true and accurate and that she did not alter them. Based on this testimony, the State adequately authenticated State’s Exhibits 4 and 5.

State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11, 226, 363 P.3d 875, 1022 (2015), disapproved of by State v. Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017)

Kearley v. State, 843 So.2d 66, 70 (Miss.App.2002) (e-mails properly authenticated where witness vouched for accuracy of printouts); Shea v. State, 167 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex.App.2005) (e-mails authenticated where complaining witness testified *227 she was familiar with the defendant’s e-mail and received the messages from him); Tibbetts v. RadioShack Corp., No. 03–C–2249, 2004 WL 2203418, at *13 (N.D.Ill.2004) (unpublished opinion) (copies of e-mails authenticated by sales manager’s testimony they were true and accurate copies); see also Annot., 34 A.L.R. 6th 253 (Authentication of Electronically Stored Evidence) § 2, pp. 269–70 (citing Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 9:9 [3d ed.] [witness who viewed original e-mail need testify only that the printout is an accurate reproduction] ).

State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11, 226–27, 363 P.3d 875, 1022 (2015), disapproved of by State v. Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017)

What about Photos? The person who takes a photo need not be the person who identifies it, State v. Pruitt, 42 Kan. App. 2d 166, 211 P. 3d 166 (2009). So, it’s sufficient for the witness to testify that the photo of injuries correctly represents his injuries on this night and that the photos were taken the following day.

2. I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 2. What is depicted in that photograph?
3. A stoplight at the intersection of 4th and Pine.
4. Is that photograph a fair and accurate representation of the stoplight at 4th and Pine as it existed on the day of the collision?
5. Yes, it is.

You can move for admission of the photograph into evidence. 

What if something about the scene depicted in the photograph has changed since the date of the collision?  In the example above, for example, what if the crash occurred on a snowy day, but the photograph was taken on a day without snow?

If you are using the photograph not to demonstrate the ground cover, but the position of the stoplight, ask the second question like this: “With the exception of absence of snow from the ground, is the photograph marked as Exhibit 2 for identification a fair and accurate representation of the intersection at 4th and Pine on the date of the collision?”

If evidence is excluded, make a proffer using K.S.A. 60-405 to preserve the issue on appeal.

Source: James W. Jeans, Trial Advocacy p. 11.6 (West 1975), Kansas Evidence Objections, Michael Am Barbara, and Kansas Law and Practice, Barbara.

Hearsay: A Refresher

Let’s consider the question of what hearsay is.  The basic definition as set out in K.S.A. 60 – 460.

 When a witness testifies something like, “She told me,” or “I heard her say,” or “I saw him pointing at the red card,” then you should be alerted to the possibility of hearsay.

As a practical matter, you do not always have to make the hearsay objection. Make the objection only if you feel the testimony will hurt your case.

Only declarative statements fall within the hearsay rule as they are assertions of facts, whether verbal or non-verbal. To determine whether an out-of-court statement is offered for its truth, it is necessary to consider the substance of the statement and then the relevant purpose for which the statement is offered. If they coincide, it is assumed that the statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. If an utterance previously made out-of-court is being offered merely to show what was said and not to assert that the content of the statement was true, then the testimony is not considered hearsay; therefore, questions, explanations, or imperatives may not be included in the rule. State vs.  Becker, 290 Kansas 842 (2010). Out-of-court statements involving libel and slander are good examples of testimony not offered to prove the truth of the matter but only to show that the words were written or said. Also, a statement made out-of-court can be admitted for the purpose of proving the effect on the listener. Alternatively, an out-of-court statement can be offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted but to explain an officer’s conduct.

If there’s more than one purpose for a particular statement, it may be offered for the nonhearsay purpose. Statements containing express assertions may also contain implied assertions qualifying as hearsay and subject to hearsay objections.

If an out-of-court statement is admitted because it is nonhearsay, the objecting party should make a request of the court to instruct the jury of its limited purpose at the time of its admission and in the written instructions that it’s not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

Evidence of discordant marital relations is admissible in a marital homicide case.

In approaching hearsay and attempting to determine if it is hearsay, you ask two questions:

1. Is there an assertion, verbal or nonverbal, made outside the courtroom?
2. If so, is it being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted? If so, then it is hearsay and isn’t admissible unless it falls within one of the statutory exceptions.

   Kansas has about 33 exceptions to the hearsay rule. The first one is for people present at the hearing and available for cross-examination, an exception not found in the Federal rule.

These concepts came from, Kansas Law and Practice, Barbara.

Requests for Admissions

The following will review some of the legal standards dealing with Requests for Admissions in a civil lawsuit, specifically whether Request for Admissions can be used for legal conclusions. Spoiler: No, however you can ask for admissions that involve the application of law to fact or opinions about either. The cases deal with Federal Rule 36 but most states have a similar rule. (click here for the Kansas rule)  

In a personal injury lawsuit much time is spent in “discovery”. This means there are tools that the lawyers can use to find out what the evidence will show prior to going to trial. Your lawyer can use written questions called interrogatories, depositions, request for production or under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure he or she can use requests for admission regarding the application of law to fact but not requests regarding the trust of a purely legal conclusion. (See Disability Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Area, 234 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2006)).

This case gave negative treatment to the Disability Council v. WMATA case, above, United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortg. Inv’rs Corp., 323 F.R.D. 424 (N.D. Ga. 2017), pointing out that the drafters suggested that the rule does not authorize requests for admissions on law unrelated to the facts of the case. See the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment.

Normally you will find Requests for Admissions used to have the parties stipulate to certain facts so these facts need not be proved at the trial. This will allow the trial to focus on the real issues between the parties and save everyone time.

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“Lord, grant that I may be able in argument, accurate in analysis, strict in study, candid with clients, and honest with adversaries. Sit with me at my desk and listen with me to my client’s plaints, read with me in my library, and stand beside me in court, so that today I shall not, in order to win a point, lose my soul.”

Sir Thomas More

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What should the notice include?

This notice should have a full account of the items. No claim shall be allowed except under the statute. The statute in subparagraph (d) indicates that the notice shall contain. This includes:

• the name an address of the claimant and
• the name an address of the claimant’s attorney,
• a concise statement of the factual basis of the claim including the date,
• time place and circumstances,
• name and address of any public officer involved,
• a concise statement of the injury, and
• a statement of monetary damages being requested.

No lawsuit shall be filed until after the claimant has received a denial notice or until after 120 days has passed.

What’s the purpose of notice?

The purpose is to allow the municipality to investigate a claim. The term municipality is defined and can include a county hospital, a school district, Inter local municipal agency, but not the Turnpike Authority. The statute applies to municipalities and claims against municipal employees acting within the scope of their employment.

What if I leave out something?

Although the statute only requires substantial compliance this is “is not achieved when a claimant’s notice fails to provide any statement of monetary damages.” Sleeth v. Sedan City Hosp., 298 Kan. 853, 854, 317 P.3d 782, 785 (2014). “Accordingly, the notice need not contain a “mechanical counting” of information addressing each enumerated category. Instead, the notice must provide the municipality with what it needs for a “full investigation and understanding of the merits of the claims advanced.” Dodge City Implement, Inc., 288 Kan. at 642, 205 P.3d 1265.” Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Shultz, 297 Kan. 769, 775, 304 P.3d 1239, 1244 (2013). The courts will overlook technical failures and look to see if the failures in the notice pose a serious obstacle to the municipalities full investigation and understanding of the merits of the claim. The courts had held that the notice did not comply with the statute when it identified the wrong claimant, didn’t give the claimant’s address, provide the attorney’s names or address when the petition didn’t accurately reflect the content of the notice or filed with the wrong public official. “…when a notice conforms with K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12–105b(d) and the petition in the district court accurately reflects the notice’s contents, subsequent amendments to the pleadings are controlled by K.S.A. 60–215—absent a showing of a claimant’s bad faith or misleading conduct in its initial submission of the claim notice.” Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Shultz, 297 Kan. 769, 778, 304 P.3d 1239, 1246 (2013).

The notice must explain the facts of the claim and the legal theories and the type of damages and assert a request for an amount of monetary damages.

The notice must be filed with the clerk or governing body of the municipality. Zeferjohn v. Shawnee County Sheriff’s Dept., 26 Kan.App.2d 379, 383, 988 P.2d 263 (1999) (service of notice on county counselor does not substantially comply with the statutory requirement that claim be filed with the county clerk) Steed v. McPherson Area Solid Waste Util., 43 Kan. App. 2d 75, 85, 221 P.3d 1157, 1164 (2010).

If the wrongful act of the municipal employee was outside the scope of the employment, then notice is not required since the municipality could not be held liable.

If the rejection period for a notice of claim filed with municipality extends beyond the end of the statute of limitations period, the statute of limitations is extended by the time that elapses between filing the notice of claim and its rejection by the governmental entity;  length of the extension of the statute of limitations will vary from case to case, but the longest possible extension of the statute of limitations would be 120 days.  K.S.A. 12-105b(d). See J.P. Asset Co., Inc. v. City of Wichita, 31 Kan.App.2d 650 (2003). Period by which statute of limitations is extended when a city denies a claim after limitations period has run is computed by counting from the date the notice of claim is filed with the city to the date the notice of rejection of the claim is received by the claimant or until after 120 days have passed following filing the notice of claim, whichever occurs first.  K.S.A. 12-105b(d). Cummings v. City of Lakin, 31 Kan.App.2d 532 (2003).

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In a 2004 case against the Mercy Health Center of Manhattan, Hallam v. Mercy Health Ctr. of Manhattan, Inc., 278 Kan. 339, 339, 97 P.3d 492, 493 (2004) it was claimed that the defendant harvested the deceased eyes and bone marrow for monetary gain and to comply with quotas without proper consent. The court said that the tort of outrage is the same tort as the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the time limit to sue is two years from the event. This decision applies the statute K.S.A. 60–513(a), stating:

“(a) The following actions shall be brought within two years:

(4) An action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated. 

This tort was formally recognized in Kansas in 1974 in the Dawson v. Associates Financial Services case where they held the statute of limitations is two years, although the earliest recognition of this type of action was in 1937 with Alderman v. Ford about the medical practitioner’s mishandling of a corpse. The Dawson case involved a debtor filing a claim against a creditor for harassment where the court indicated there was evidence that the harassment aggravated the plaintiff’s physical condition, so the plaintiff sued asking the court to adopt the Restatement of Torts Second section 46(1). (note: later Congress adopted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in 1977 to deal with abusive collection practices). The plaintiff in Dawson was afflicted with Multiple Sclerosis and was susceptible to emotional injury, a fact which carried great weight with the court. Later courts have held that just acting in a discourteous manner in pursuing legal rights is not outrageous conduct. The courts have been reluctant to extend this claim to the employment setting, although it applied it to a former’s employers conduct that got out of hand in Taiwo vs. Vu a 1991 case.

“In order to prevail in a claim of intentionally causing emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) The conduct of the defendant was intentional, or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) there was a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s mental distress; and (4) the plaintiff’s mental distress was extreme and severe. Taiwo v. Vu, 249 Kan. 585, 592, 822 P.2d 1024 (1991) (citing Roberts v. Saylor, 230 Kan. 289, 292–93, 637 P.2d 1175 [1981] ).” Valadez v. Emmis Commc’ns, 290 Kan. 472, 476, 229 P.3d 389, 394 (2010).

The court pointed out that the tort has two requirements including the defendant conduct was extreme and the emotional distress inflicted is severe and explained that such conduct might be privileged. Later cases have outlined what conduct constitutes the tort of outrage, and you will find if you read the cases the court tolerate a lot of bad conduct before it gets outraged.

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A Lawyer’s Prayer

“Lord, grant that I may be able in argument, accurate in analysis, strict in study, candid with clients, and honest with adversaries. Sit with me at my desk and listen with me to my client’s plaints, read with me in my library, and stand beside me in court, so that today I shall not, in order to win a point, lose my soul.”

Sir Thomas More

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